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I. INTRODUCTION
Jobs are contracts. Or, to put it more precisely: the employment
relationship finds its legal representation in a contract. The decision to
provide labor on behalf of another person or organization is legally
cemented through the creation of an agreement that is express or implied,
oral or written, term or at-will. The role of contract, however, is often
overlooked in the world of labor and employment law. The basic
employment agreement has been layered over with a dizzying variety of
federal and state statutes that impose specific responsibilities on the parties.
As recent legislative efforts such as California A.B. 51 have made even
clearer, the parties do not choose whether the relationship is characterized
as employment or not; the characterization is based on the relationship’s
structure. Employment has moved closer towards becoming a status—a set
of legal obligations that come with a particular role, rather than obligations
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individually assumed by the particular parties.2
Despite the importance of these statutory interventions, the reality
remains that employment requires a contract to exist.3 As a result, the
employment relationship is governed in part by the common law of
contract—the collection of judicial decisions that together form the core of
contract law. Professor Charles Sullivan—the subject of this muchdeserved festschrift—has not forgotten the common law’s importance. In a
series of articles on contractual terms in employment agreements, Sullivan
has dug into the landscape of common-law precedent and scholarship to
unearth important understandings about the role of law in contract. In this
still relatively young century, Sullivan and Professor Rachel ArnowRichman4 have done the most to contribute to our understanding of contract
law in the employment context. As their scholarship reminds us, the
employment contract is not a formality to be rushed past, but rather an
important touchstone for both the parties and the community in setting the
terms and expectations of the relationship.
This essay takes contracts and contract law seriously in thinking about
the nature of the employment relationship. Part II considers the traditional
debate between status and contract and depicts the debate as one between
forms of communitarianism and libertarianism. In Part III, I discuss
Sullivan’s work on the employment contract and the role of common-law
doctrine in the context of those contracts. Sullivan highlights the

2
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements
and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 380 (2006) (noting that the employment relationship is “fundamentally contractual” but
“is also constrained by employee rights and entitlements that are established by external
law, that reflect public values and interests, and that typically cannot be varied or waived by
contract”); Bryce Yoder, Note, How Reasonable Is “Reasonable”? The Search for a
Satisfactory Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1521 (2008)
(arguing that “a strict contract-based analysis of the validity and interpretation of
employment handbooks should be abandoned in favor of a common-sense approach that
acknowledges the employment relationship as one of status”).
3
There are instances where a worker recovers in restitution, but in those cases either
the worker was an employee who also had a contractual relationship, see, e.g., Britton v.
Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834), or the worker was a quasi-volunteer who only performed
because no contract could be created, see, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 (Ark.
1907).
4
Professor Arnow-Richman is one of Sullivan’s co-authors and also a presenter at this
symposium. For some examples of her scholarship on the role of contract in employment
law, see Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C. L.
REV. 427 (2016); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The
Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513 (2015);
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1 (2010); Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment
Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1 (2003).
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importance of contractual terms in his articles on clergy contracts,
unenforceable terms, and contractual remedies. Part IV compares
Sullivan’s scholarship to the work of private-law scholars who have
focused on the relations between individual contracting parties. Like these
private-law scholars, Sullivan highlights the importance of common law
and the nuances of understanding that can arise from careful legal
craftsmanship. But Sullivan also reminds us that contract law is shaped by
societal concerns, and that common-law judges have reflected public policy
concerns in the doctrine. Part V discusses one aspect of the common-law
employment relationship that extends beyond private contract: namely,
organizational rights. The role of the worker within the organization is one
aspect of the relationship that Sullivan, and many others, have in my view
underappreciated, and I explain my perspective here. The essay concludes
in Part VI.
II. THE CONTESTED ROLE OF CONTRACT IN EMPLOYMENT
Employment is both contractual and non-contractual. On the one
hand, the employment relationship requires a contract; without an
agreement, there is no relationship. A worker who offers her work without
a promise or expectation of payment is a volunteer—not an employee.5
The agreement may be implied-in-fact, but the worker must at least have an
expectation of compensation for her labor to be as an employee.6 On the
other hand, the employment relationship is determined by the nature of the
relationship itself, rather than by the express terms of the agreement. The
two parties cannot mutually agree that an “employee” (as defined by
factors set forth in a particular statute) is nevertheless not an employee.7
This duality also represents competing perspectives on the normative
framework for employment. A contractual perspective on employment
5
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An individual is
a volunteer and not an employee if the individual renders uncoerced services to a principal
without being offered a material inducement.”).
6
California has developed a doctrine of implied-in-fact contract to rebut the state’s
statutory presumption of at-will employment. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc., 8 P.3d 1089,
1101 (Cal. 2000) (“The contractual understanding need not be express, but may be implied
in fact, arising from the parties’ conduct evidencing their actual mutual intent to create such
enforceable limitations.”); Julia Barnhart, The Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception to AtWill Employment: A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L. REV. 817, 819 (1998) (“Pursuant to this
exception, a California employee can rebut her at-will status by showing the existence of an
implied-in-fact contract with the employer such that the employee can be terminated only
for good cause.”).
7
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. g (“The underlying economic
realities of the employment relationship, rather than any designation or characterization of
the relationship in an agreement or employer policy statement, determine whether a
particular individual is an employee.”).
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focuses on the private ordering that leads to the agreement between the
parties. In order to enter a contract, both parties have to voluntarily agree
to an exchange.8 The idea that contract is an extension of free will is
supported by both moral theories and economic theories of the law.
Contracts have been characterized as “essentially self-imposed” obligations
undertaken through promise,9 as well as exchanges which will render both
parties better off as a result.10 Based on these twin rationales, the law
presumes that properly formed contracts should be enforced on their own
terms. This presumption applies to employment contracts as well. As one
prominent casebook in the field recognizes: “[i]n reality then, despite
substantial federal regulation, the many aspects of the most important terms
of the employment relationship—job security, wages, benefits—are left to
private ordering between employers and employees.”11
As originally conceived (or at least justified), the move to a
contractual basis for the employment relationship freed workers from their
status as “servants” under the law. Under a status-based system, masters
had the right to command servants based simply on their social position
and not on negotiated agreements.12 The conception of employment as
contractual was seen as liberating, since it gave employees the power to
control their own destinies.13 This perspective developed as part of a
general approach to the employment relationship as one of contract, rather
than status.14 The Supreme Court during its much-maligned “Lochner Era”
8
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (defining a
contract as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty”).
9
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2
(2d ed. 2015).
10
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (8th ed. 2011) (noting the
“importance of voluntary exchanges in moving resources from less to more valuable uses”).
11
TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS xxvii (2d ed. 2011).
12
See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
278–92 (1993).
13
See SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 169–70 (14th ed. 1984) (1861)
(“If then we employ Status, agreeably with the usage of the best writers, to signify these
personal conditions only, and avoid applying the term to such conditions as are the
immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”); Aditi Bagchi, The Myth
of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579, 598 (2009) (“Status is
associated with unfreedom. Not just the requirement of consent, but also its dispositive role
in contract, guard against a rigid social order imposed from above.”).
14
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
3 (7th ed. 2011) (“Traditionally, the law considered employment to be a matter of private
contract between the employer and employee.”).
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endeavored to preserve freedom of contract by striking down workplace
regulation.15 Workers and employers should be free, concluded the Court,
to arrive at their own arrangements without intervention from federal and
state legislatures.16 Although the constitutional power of the Contracts
Clause has significantly diminished, nevertheless there is still significant
academic and judicial support for a primarily contractual approach to
employment.17
The modern status-based or regulatory approach to employment
recognizes its contractual nature but believes in the necessity of guardrails
on behalf of employees. The New Deal began a steady march of statutory
regimes that imposed minimum terms or legal mechanisms on the
employment relationship: the National Labor Relations Act,18 the Fair
Labor Standards Act,19 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,20 the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act,21 the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,22 the Americans with Disabilities Act,23 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act,24 to name the basics. Accompanying these federal statutes are
state laws that supplement or expand upon these protections. Labor and
employment laws restructure the employment relationship in myriad
ways.25
15
See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559–62 (1923) (negating
minimum wage law), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
Coppage v. Kansas, 235 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (rendering prohibitions against yellow-dog
contracts invalid); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1905) (striking down
limitation on working hours).
16
See, e.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545 (“Within this [contractual] liberty are contracts of
employment of labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the parties have an
equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can as the result of private
bargaining.”); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908) (“The right of a person to
sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of
the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from
the person offering to sell it.”).
17
See GLYNN, ARNOW-RICHMAN & SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at xxviii (noting that “in
recent decades there has been a retreat from mandates and a corresponding increased
commitment to private ordering”); Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Solutions for
Employment Law Problems, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 789 (2015). Cf. DAVID E.
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 23 (2011) (defending the Lochner decision as a defense of small
business and individual rights).
18
29 U.S.C. §§ 159–169 (2018).
19
Id. §§ 201–219.
20
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–17 (2018).
21
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1381.
22
Id. §§ 651–678.
23
45 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2018).
24
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654.
25
Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1539 (2006)
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Supporters of regulation in the labor market—which would likely
encompass most of the labor and employment academy—seek to justify
these interventions, either each individually or together as an overall
approach.26 Although it would be impossible to characterize the universe
of justifications accurately and concisely, the most common approach
focuses on the disparity in power between employers and employees. Even
assuming that private ordering might make sense for relatively equal
economic actors, goes the argument, it does not make sense when
individual workers are bargaining with large organizations over terms and
conditions of work. The bargaining is too unfair.27 If we just leave the
parties to the market, employees will be taken advantage of, and possible
third-party harms will result as well.28 Regulation is required to balance
out the playing field and prevent opportunistic behavior.29
These two normative frameworks—private ordering versus
regulation—nudge their supporters to focus on these respective areas of
law. Private-ordering proponents spend more time on the law of contract,
while interventionists tend to spend their time elucidating the interventions.
In fact, many supporters of aggressive regulation have argued that contract
law is not merely passive; it is instead actively enlisted to keep workers
oppressed. As Robert Gordon argued:
“Freedom of contract” in practice was not a laissez[-]faire
regime in which the parties were left at large to bargain out the
content of their contracts. It was rather a regime in which the
(describing the four pillars of work law as “employment law, labor law, employment
discrimination, and some variation of a tax-oriented employee-benefits law”).
26
See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A
Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 376 (2002)
(defining employee vulnerabilities along three metrics: democratic deficits within the
relationship, economic dependency, and social/psychological dependency).
27
Bagchi, supra note 13, at 580 (noting that the inequality between employees and
employers is “multi-dimensional”).
28
Robert W. Gordon, Britton v. Turner: A Signpost on the Crooked Road to
“Freedom” in the Employment Contract, in CONTRACTS STORIES 186, 225–26 (Douglas G.
Baird ed., 2007) (“‘Freedom of contract’ is a slogan whose practical meaning is that the
state should not—at least, not very visibly—change the constellation of rules so as to disturb
the legal system’s status quo distribution of state power to coerce people through its award
of rights to grant and withhold valuable resources, and its conferral of organization
capacity.”).
29
See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Labor Law Reform Again? Reframing Labor Law as a
Regulatory Project, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 385 (2013) (“[W]e need to
envision the regulation of work as one among many fields of regulation, alongside the
regulation of consumer products, the environment, and financial integrity. Reconceiving of
labor law as a regulatory project brings into view an alternative set of analytical levers and
tools of governance, as well as additional reservoirs of political support for the ultimate ends
pursued by labor law.”).
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legal system supplied implied terms largely favoring employers
and in other ways threw its weight behind employers’ power to
impose contract terms, backed up by the sanctions of dismissal
and even (in some periods and situations) criminal prosecutions
and injunctions.30
In other words, contract law has been part of the problem—not merely an
innocent bystander to the employer’s predations.
Charlie Sullivan certainly does not shy away from regulatory
interventions into the employment contract.31 But neither does he neglect
the common law of contract or dismiss the contract itself. Instead, he
returns to these topics to probe more deeply into contract law’s treatment of
the underlying fairness concerns driving the regulatory perspective. The
common law of contract does, in fact, have doctrines that protect workers
against certain terms and conditions, and it does have a tradition of policing
agreements for fairness.32 Moreover, Sullivan also recognizes the
importance of contracts and contract terms to the parties and the courts.
Because contracts matter, Sullivan takes them seriously on their own terms.
The next section explores a few examples of how Sullivan’s scholarship
drills down into the employment contract while not deferring to a privateordering perspective.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACTS IN EMPLOYMENT
What if employers and employees could not form binding contracts?
What if they could negotiate agreements, but those agreements were not
enforceable in court? This strange scenario may be in play when it comes
to religious organizations and clergy. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,33 the Supreme Court held that
antidiscrimination laws did not apply to churches with respect to their
clergy members—those who “preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and
carry out their mission.”34 A church employee had brought an Americans
with Disabilities Act claim with no specific connection to religious doctrine
or practice; nevertheless, the Court held that religious organizations needed
30

Gordon, supra note 28, at 223.
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg:
Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1020
(2013) (arguing that the NLRA prohibits class-action arbitration waivers); Charles A.
Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 428 (2018) (arguing for stronger
antidiscrimination protections in the face of AI human-resources decision-making).
32
Bagchi, supra note 13, at 584 (“Numerous courts have observed a disparity in
bargaining power between employers and employees, and many have justified proemployee defaults or interpretations on this basis.”).
33
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
34
Id. at 196.
31

BODIE (DO NOT DELETE)

1268

5/16/2020 2:59 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1261

an exemption from the statute in order to avoid unconstitutional
entanglement with the free exercise of religion.35
Since the Court exempted churches from claims under unrelated
statutory employment protections, it seems to follow that any legal claim
by a minister against the church would be barred, including common-law
claims. The Court, however, did not reach this question.36 In his article
Clergy Contracts, Charlie Sullivan takes it up and argues that “a refusal to
enforce contracts by churches can itself be seen as discriminatory against
the church as an institution.”37 As Sullivan points out, “contract law
remains the primary legal regulator of a vast and complex economy.”38 If
churches were denied the ability to contract, that would render them
“second-class citizens,” like minor children or the mentally incompetent.39
Preventing churches from engaging in enforceable agreements might seem
to benefit those institutions, but it also denies them the autonomy to make
binding promises to their leaders, teachers, and celebrants.40 Churches
could not credibly commit to terms and conditions of employment, and
ministers would be less secure in the promises made and thus perhaps less
likely to take a particular position. Sullivan argues that such contracts
should be enforceable if the underlying issue does not involve an
interpretation of church doctrine. He also argues that these agreements
should include a dispute-resolution mechanism that would be better able to
resolve ecclesiastical concerns than would a secular court.41
It is important to note, I think, that Sullivan is not arguing for
contractual enforceability simply to protect employee rights. Rather,
Sullivan recognizes that contract is an important mechanism in establishing
the relationship between the parties. Nullifying all such contracts would be
“seriously problematic from the perspective of religious educational
institutions generally and perhaps of any kind of religious institution that
needs the security of contracts in order to structure its operations.”42 If the
church can walk away from the contract at any time, it is not really a
35

Id. at 188 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through
its appointments.”).
36
Id. at 196.
37
Charles A. Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 371, 375
(2018) [hereinafter Sullivan, Clergy Contracts].
38
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 399.
39
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 399–400; see also id. at 375 (“Infants
and incompetents are restricted in their ability to contract, thus rendering them less than full
members of our society.”).
40
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 393.
41
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 406–07.
42
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 406.
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contract at all.43 While allowing that there is some value to purely
hortatory documents, Sullivan nevertheless illuminates the problematic
ramifications of the Supreme Court’s effort to separate religious institutions
from secular law.
Agreements sitting outside the scope of judicial protection are also
considered in Sullivan’s The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable
Contract Terms.44 Certain categories of contract terms, such as liability
waivers, noncompete clauses, and arbitration agreements, can be written so
as to be unenforceable due to public policy or fairness concerns. For
example, covenants not to compete cannot be unreasonably overbroad by
restricting employees for too long a time period or too wide a geographic
region. These clauses, however, still exist in “the wild” in real contracts
applying to real people. There may be a temptation to just ignore their
existence, as courts will not enforce them, rendering them toothless. But
Sullivan takes this as a theoretical challenge: why might these clauses still
find their way into contracts?
Rather than harmless tchotchkes, Sullivan argues, these clauses do in
fact have power. They can act as a starting point in the judicial
negotiation—a first offer that sets the bar.45 In addressing overbroad
covenants not to compete as well as unbalanced arbitration agreements,
courts often pare back the offending terms until they become reasonable.46
The result is a no-lose situation for employers: either the clause is enforced
as written, or the clause is rewritten to be enforceable. Sullivan also notes
that employees may make decisions based on the (naïve) view that the
clauses do in fact apply to them.47 As a result, they may decide not to
switch to another job or may fail to bring a claim under a seemingly unfair
arbitration agreement. The appropriate response to this opportunism would
seem to be punishment, rather than accommodation, and courts have
43

Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 377.
Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 1127 (2009) [hereinafter Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence].
45
Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1147 (finding that “courts, while
refusing to enforce the clause as written, typically enforce a cleaned-up version of it”).
Extreme clauses can also have an anchoring effect on the parties, warping their sense of
what would be fair. Under anchoring and adjustment, “the first number with which a
decision-maker is presented has a demonstrable effect on that person’s ultimate choice. In
essence, the first number heard becomes the place away from which any adjustment is
made.” Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew T. Bodie, The Effects of Jury Ignorance
About Damage Caps: The Case of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1378
(2005); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457–58 (1981) (finding anchoring effects even when
participants know the number has been randomly generated).
46
Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1157.
47
Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1136, 1175, 1177.
44
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refused to enforce the agreement at all if they found the clause was drafted
and negotiated in bad faith.48 Sullivan, however, notes that a background
norm of contract law may dampen this sanction.49 Courts generally try to
follow the will of these parties so as to honor their private agreement. This
desire to hew as close as possible to the original bargain may drive courts
to reform, rather than reject.50 Instead of cutting back on unenforceable
clauses, Sullivan argues that common-law courts should generally refuse to
enforce them at all, and only reform them if the deviation is “truly minor
and unintentional.”51 Otherwise, the employer will be able to take
advantage of both employees and the courts that do their modifications for
them.
Remedies are generally neglected in academic writing, as they cut
across substantive subject areas and involve technical, somewhat mundane
matters. But Sullivan has an eye for the unexamined, as evidenced by his
review of the Restatement of Employment Law’s chapter on remedies.52
Contract remedies may seem straightforward in the employment context:
employees get backpay, and employers get injunctions against employee
competition. As Sullivan explains, however, important details lurk beneath
the surface. Framing his inquiry under the usual standard for contractual
expectation relief, Sullivan compares and contrasts the nuances of the
doctrine to determine its overall balance as represented by the
Restatement.53 Among his observations: both the Restatement and most
courts permit injunctions against employees in too many cases;54 health
care insurance is improperly left out of the Restatement’s consequential
damages;55 and collateral sources such as unemployment compensation are
not to be deducted from employee damages.56 Sullivan does a particularly
48
See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.08 (finding that a noncompete clause
should not be modified if “the employer lacked a reasonable and good-faith basis for
believing the covenant was enforceable”).
49
Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1170–74.
50
The psychological heuristic of anchoring may also play a role. By setting forth the
original (and unenforceable) version of the clause, the employer encourages the court to
anchor from that version and then move away from it, rather than coming up with the best
possible answer from scratch. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 45, at 457–58.
51
Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1176.
52
Charles A. Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1391
(2015) [hereinafter Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies].
53
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1402 (“Traditional
contracts doctrine generally vindicates the injured party’s expectation interest, which means
giving her a sum that will put her in a position she would have occupied had the contract
been performed.”).
54
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1394–98.
55
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1399–1400.
56
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1409.
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detailed examination of mitigation, discussing how courts may fail to
include various relevant factors, such as geographic location, reputational
consequences, and the length of time elapsed.57 Overall, Sullivan
concludes that that the Restatement reflects the pro-employer slant of
common-law remedies, with some minor tweaks that may level the playing
field a bit.58
Sullivan’s careful exegesis of employment contract remedies reflects
both his concern for employee welfare as well as his facility with minutiae.
He judges the Restatement based on how employee-friendly it is, ultimately
finding it a “mixed bag” on that score.59 At the same time, he engages with
the Restatement point-by-point, often getting most animated with a
particular illustration or an ambiguous doctrine. He obviously cares about
legal craftsmanship. And he believes that even though the common law of
contract is tilted towards employers, it is worth engaging with it, even if
only to improve it incrementally. To provide one example, Sullivan is
perturbed at the Restatement’s solicitousness towards an obscure area of
the law known as “lowered-sights” doctrine, which pertains to mitigation
after a length of time.60
These three articles illustrate Sullivan’s approach to contract and
contract law. He is not enamored with private ordering; he does not want
to leave the parties to their own market-related devices. Nevertheless, he
takes contracts and contract law seriously, and he advocates for an
approach that makes sense within the doctrine while acknowledging and
adjusting for the bias against employees within the realm of private
contract. Critical to Sullivan’s approach is the recognition that the
common law of contract takes the needs of society into account. Sullivan
has revived and illuminated the importance of contract law to third parties
and society. He recognizes that it is not simply private ordering.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIETY IN CONTRACT LAW
By taking contracts and contract law seriously, Charlie Sullivan shares
intellectual commitments with the private-law theorists who do the same.
57

Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1404–09.
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1420.
59
Id.; see also id. at 1392 (noting the “tension between, on the one hand, faithfully
counting judicial noses and, on the other, adopting some better view—often as expounded in
the law reviews and by a few courts who are more employee-friendly than most”).
60
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1407–08; see id. at 1408
(“It would be preferable to simply continue with the current majority rule, which would
apply the same standard to whether mitigation was required regardless of how much time
passes.”).
58
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Unlike the discipline of law and economics, which judges the law by its
maximization of utility, private-law theorists can broadly be said to support
the idea that “the purpose of private law is to be private law.”61 In other
words, the law need not be a mere means to another end; the law can be an
end unto itself.62 Such an appeal to formalism may seem hopelessly naïve
after the barrage of critiques from legal realism, critical legal studies, and
the aforementioned law and economics. But the project of private-law
theorists, particularly supporters of the New Private Law Theory, could be
fairly characterized as a return to the importance of doctrine.63
Sullivan, of course, does care about outcomes—he is consistently proemployee and advocates for rules that favor employees. But more than
most labor and employment academics, he also cares about doctrine. This
is his self-confessed interest.64 But it is also demonstrated in his articles
and their conscientious attention to the specifics of doctrine. In this way,
he shares important methodological principles with private-law theorists,
who are also known for their attention to doctrinal nuances. This
description of New Private Law could apply as well to Sullivan’s work:
New Private Law theorists recognize the value of a pragmatism
that is sensitive to which functions the law serves, critical as to
how well it is serving those functions, and open-minded about
how it might better serve them. We insist, however, that
understanding private law goes far beyond an appreciation of its
salutary functions and its limits. The task requires understanding
the concepts and principles entrenched in the law and the
structures, institutions, and languages that implement these
concepts through the practices of courts, legislators, and
lawyers.65
Although, to my knowledge, Sullivan has not written on or in the New
Private Law tradition, there would seem to be fruitful grounds for a

61

ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995).
John Oberdiek, Method and Morality in the New Private Law of Torts, 125 HARV. L.
REV. F. 189, 190 (2012) (“To understand how to resolve a legal question, in short,
formalism demands that we appeal to the law, not to some extralegal goal, whatever its
merits are as a goal.”).
63
Id. (characterizing New Private Law as “self-consciously aspir[ing] to draw insight
from both instrumentalism and formalism”).
64
Charles A. Sullivan, When Employee = Employer, JOTWELL (Feb. 10, 2011),
https://worklaw.jotwell.com/when-employee-employer/ (“I admit to being old-fashioned
enough to like well-done doctrinal articles. Especially ones that upset conventional
wisdom—the courts, the agencies, and the law reviews—by suggesting that, not to put too
fine a point on it, everybody’s wrong. Doctrinally.”).
65
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1757, 1757 (2012).
62
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crossover.66 Private-law theorists have written on the importance of an
“internal” perspective to common-law subjects, including contracts.67 The
internal perspective refers to the idea that individuals are not all bad actors
who seek to violate the law whenever rational to do so. Instead, some
people internalize the law and follow it because it is the law.68 Rebecca
Stone has discussed how certain contract doctrines are best described as
efforts to protect good-faith internalizers from the predations of rational
and rule-breaking externalizers.
For example, in discussing the
supercompensatory damages that are sometimes awarded in the context of
willful breach, she states: “we should define a willful breach as one where
the contract breaker acts for the wrong reasons under conditions in which
the promisee is unlikely to be able to use the legal system to protect his
expectation interest.”69 This idea matches up extremely well with Charlie’s
concern about overbroad noncompete and arbitration agreements.70 In
these situations, employers have written intentionally overbroad clauses
that would not be enforced by courts; as Charlie emphasizes, employees
may be “unaware of the fact and likely to remain unaware” that the clause
is unenforceable.71 As a result, we have a situation analogous to the willful
breach: one sides acts with the knowledge that the other side is unlikely to
vindicate her rights. In both of these situations, the lawbreaker should be
punished, not just made to compensate, to discourage efforts to use contract

66
Sullivan has written about the importance of common law as part of the overall
fabric of legal protections. See Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?:
Torts and Other Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079,
1079–80 (2014) (“The question before us is the influence of tort law on the interpretation of
the anti-discrimination statutes, and I’ll spare the reader an historical exegesis that might
lead us to conclude that it’s torts all the way down. However maybe the broader point is
that it’s law all the way down, and that our current system of categorizing legal doctrines
into neat subject matters may be due more to our need to teach law students pieces of the socalled seamless web than to any natural cleavages in intellectual discourse.”).
67
Andrew S. Gold, Internal and External Perspectives: On Methodology in the New
Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2020) (“If there is a common feature that cuts across New Private Law
scholarship, it is an interest in the internal point of view.”), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=3379364; Rebecca Stone, Economic Analysis of Contract Law from the
Internal Point of View, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2005, 2008 (2016) (defining internalizers as
“agents who adopt legal rules as reasons for action even when their self-interest (and other
things they care about) dictates doing otherwise”).
68
Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 215
(2011) (contending that legal duties themselves motivate individuals to follow the law);
Stone, supra note 67, at 2007 (considering “the more realistic assumption that many legal
subjects are motivated to conform to the law because it is the law”).
69
Stone, supra note 67, at 2043.
70
See Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44.
71
Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1136.
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law opportunistically.72
Overall, the New Private Law theorists have reverence for the
traditions and complexities of the common law and respect for the practice
of private citizens engaging with the law.73 Sullivan is, essentially, asking
employers and courts to engage in the same practice. If employers took
seriously their normative duties to contract appropriately, employment
contracts would better reflect the ideal bargain between the two parties.
Instead, employers—on the advice of counsel, and with the tacit support of
economists—have often acted like Holmes’ “bad man,” trying to get away
with as much as they can.74 Sullivan and the New Private Law theorists
would find common cause in supporting a more considered and attentive
approach to common-law responsibilities on behalf of employers and their
representatives.75
There is one axis upon which Sullivan and the private-law theorists
would have a sharp divide: the relationship between private law and public
law—or, more broadly, between private law and society. Private-law
theorists bring their focus to the interactions between individuals to the

72
Cf. Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of
Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529, 532 (2011) (“I label the core interpretive claim
of this Article—that contractual liability consists of consent to retaliation in the event of
breach—the civil recourse theory.”).
73
As John Goldberg has described it:
The New Private Law is thus in part an effort to recapture the normative
dimensions of private interactions (that is, interactions within civil society).
In doing so, it rejects the supposition that the norms of private law reduce
down to norms of public law. It also rejects the contrary supposition that
private interaction is a “Hobbesian” domain in which self-interest is given
free rein, or in which persons interact atomistically. Contracting, for
example, is a distinctively normative practice. It is governed by legal
concepts that include, most basically, the idea of a bargained-for exchange
(as opposed to a gift or a sham exchange) and good faith in performance.
The basic challenge for courts in applying contract law is to determine in a
given case the particular ways in which parties have or have not obligated
themselves to one another, within the terms permitted by law.
John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640,
1661–62 (2012).
74
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897)
(“But what does [the notion of legal duty] mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first
place, a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable
consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money.”); Stone, supra
note 67, at 2007 (“The Holmesian ‘bad man’ view of the law that economists favor follows
from a positive conception of legal subjects as agents who know what is best for themselves
and single-mindedly pursue their own self-interest.”).
75
Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1484
(2005) (discussing theories from Charles Fried and Stephen Smith that have offered “unified
theories around the moral force of promising”).
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exclusion of government actors.76 Nate Oman and Jason Solomon provide
the following description: “[w]hen invoking the term ‘private law,’ we . . .
simply mean to refer to common-law subjects like torts, contract, and
property (and their statutory counterparts) that involve primary rights by
individuals that can be enforced by the rights-holders themselves against
other individuals and entities.”77 By focusing on individual actors, privatelaw theorists seek to strip out societal concerns and focus on dyadic
interactions. Private law emphasizes the autonomy of the person and the
moral gravity of individual choices.78 It is important to note that this
emphasis on private relationships cannot be equated with the commitment
to private ordering in law and economics. Private-law theory has largely
rejected the calculus of utility maximization as the appropriate metric;
instead, the moral dilemma of the choice is paramount.79 Despite these
differences, however, both New Private Law and law and economics focus
on the respect given to individual choices, and the need to enforce private
agreements.80
This focus on dyadic interactions, however, fails to represent the
concern the common law has traditionally had for the societal ramifications
of these individual interactions. Courts have long been suspicious of
liquidated damages, covenants not to compete, and arbitration agreements,
even if mutually agreed upon; all of these are subject to reasonableness
76
Goldberg, supra note 73, at 1640 (“Private law defines the rights and duties of
individuals and private entities as they relate to one another. It stands in contrast to public
law, which establishes the powers and responsibilities of governments, defines the rights
and duties of individuals in relation to governments, and governs relations between and
among nations.”).
77
Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law,
62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1111–12 (2013).
78
See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 6 (2016) (arguing that private law
should be based on “the moral idea that no person is in charge of another”).
79
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1725
(2012) (“Conventionally it is thought that moral and philosophically oriented theories of
property (and private law) are incompatible with law and economics and other related
functional or consequentialist approaches.”); see also Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of
Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (2009) (finding that “there are
occasions on which breach of contract is immoral because the contractual breach is a
relevant instance of an immoral form of breach of promise”).
80
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, One-Legged Contracting, 133 HARV. L. REV.
F. 1, 3–4 (2019), https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/11/one-legged-contracting/ (“A distinctive feature of contractual obligations is that they are both voluntary and chosen. Contractual
obligations are voluntary in the sense that the parties must agree to them, unlike most duties
found in tort or criminal law. Contractual obligations are chosen in the sense that the parties
get to decide for themselves the content of the obligations.”); see also Steve Hedley, The
Rise and Fall of Private Law Theory, 134 L. Q. REV. 214 (2018) (discussing both law and
economics and moral theories of private law as overly attentive to individual relationships
rather than societal concerns).
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tests under the common law.81 Moreover, other default rules or
presumptions build in public policy to standard doctrine. The interpretive
canon of contra proferentum—construing an ambiguous term against its
drafter—incentivizes clarity but also helps the consumer in a boilerplate
agreement.82 Throughout common law doctrines, courts have incorporated
broader concerns about disparity in bargaining power83 and vindication of
public policy.84 The common law frequently incorporates societal
perspectives in its ecosystem of private rights and wrongs.
The public orientation of many common-law doctrines can sometime
be lost in the academic literature. This predisposition is certainly rooted in
history, as courts have repeatedly used common-law doctrines to restrict
workers’ rights.85 The importance of broader social concerns within the
private law, however, is never far from view in Sullivan’s scholarship on
common-law doctrines. He recognizes the traditions of equity and public
policy that are still alive within the common law. Although a great deal of
his scholarship has centered around federal antidiscrimination statutes,86
Sullivan has not glossed over the common law as a meaningful body of
law. Rather, he has focused on how the common law has been used and
can be used to achieve societal ends, including the protection of employees.
This focus on broader societal concerns is evident in Sullivan’s
treatment of several contract doctrines in the context of employment. In his
treatment of covenants not to compete, Sullivan emphasizes the third-party
harms from noncompete clauses that come not only from depressed hiring
markets for employees but also restraint of trade and loss of productive
work.87 Allowing employers to have the benefit of the doubt in rendering
such clauses “reasonable” after the fact only adds to these societal
81
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (unconscionability), §
356(1) (liquidated damages); RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 8.05–08 (covenants
not to compete).
82
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206. This presumption has
been applied against employers. See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443
F.2d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that any doubt over the definition of a term would be
resolved against the employer, because the “agreement was a standard form contract drawn
up by [the employer]” who “had superior bargaining power”).
83
See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 13, at 586 (“In searching for a way to articulate the
problem endemic in most employment relations, inequality of bargaining power is appealing
because it would appear to speak to a defect recognizable on the terms of classical, formal
contract theory.”).
84
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 5.01–03 (public policy tort).
85
See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 24–28 (1st ed. 2016).
86
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of
Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157 (2012); Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly
Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2011).
87
See Sullivan, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 44, at 1151.
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maladies.88 Moreover, in discussing the English phenomenon of “garden
leave,” where employees are paid not to compete for a period of time,
Sullivan admits that such contracts seem like a big step up from
uncompensated noncompetition periods.89 And indeed, focusing merely on
the employer-employee relationship, garden leave gives the employer its
period of protection while providing the employee with wages and benefits.
Sullivan, however, also recognizes the societal costs of competition
restrictions, as well as the possibility that judges may be more likely to
allow such restrictions when garden leave is included. In his view, the
overall assessment of garden leave is “a very complicated inquiry.”90
Similarly, Sullivan has been a consistent skeptic of arbitration in the
employment context. In part, he has looked to statutory protections to
restrain or nullify employer access to arbitration as a dispute-resolution
forum.91
Although a private-ordering approach would look more
receptively on the possibility of contractually created dispute resolution,
Sullivan favors striking down these agreements when they have infringed
upon workers’ rights to collective adjudications.92 Scholars have argued
that the state has an obligation to intercede in these private agreements to
protect access to justice.93 Sullivan supports this tradition and believes that
these agreements have more to do with the lack of employee power than
they do with the sanctity of moral engagements—or with Pareto-optimal
decision-making.94 This concern with employer overreaching also has a
tradition within the common law.95
88

Id.
Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition Via “Garden
Leave,” 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 323–24 (2016).
90
Id. at 325.
91
Timothy P. Glynn & Charles A. Sullivan, Murphy Oil and Norris LaGuardia to the
Rescue: Preserving Employee Rights to Concerted Dispute Resolution in an Era of
Mandatory Individual Arbitration, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 401 (2018); Sullivan & Glynn,
supra note 31.
92
See Glynn & Sullivan, supra note 91, at 414 (arguing that federal statutes protect
employees’ right to collective dispute resolution).
93
See Margaret Jane Radin, The Fiduciary State and Private Ordering, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 315, 315 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016)
(arguing that American “legal institutions are flouting their fiduciary obligation to the
American people” by allowing the enforcement of arbitration clauses in consumer
contracts).
94
See Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 31, at 1065 (discussing the employer’s interest in
deterring employee suits).
95
See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co., 443 F.2d 205, 213 (1st Cir. 1971)
(noting that any doubt over the definition of a term would be resolved against the employer,
because the “agreement was a standard form contract drawn up by [the employer]” who
“had superior bargaining power”); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6
89
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In making the point about Sullivan’s commitment to the public good,
I may be drawing the lines too sharply. Private-law theorists have
recognized that “[a]lthough private law is concerned to address the
interactions of individuals and entities, it does so as part of a political
system in which government is the bearer of powers over, and duties owed
to, those individuals and entities.”96 Nevertheless, Sullivan would
undoubtedly agree with the sentiments of Steve Hedley’s concerns about
power imbalances in contract:
And if we truly seek to respect the rights of individuals, we
cannot confine our attention to the two-party relationships
favoured by corrective justice theorists. It is all too probable that
at least one of the parties will be a “repeat player,” who
participates in these two-party relationships on a routine basis,
and so acts in a manner very different from first-time players.
Our theories of contract should therefore not neglect the
possibility that one side will (say) produce a set of standard
terms, and refuse to deal on any other basis, even though the
other party lacks the time or the experience to comprehend those
terms; asking whether any resulting agreement is one that the
law should enforce is a very different question from those that
corrective justice theorists ask.97
There is one respect, however, in which I think Sullivan, private-law
theorists, private-ordering supporters, and even the common law have all
overlooked an important aspect of the employment relationship. And that
is in the organizational relationship between the employer and its
employees.
V. THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION IN CONTRACT AND EMPLOYMENT
Employees do not work for themselves. In the tautological definition
provided by several federal statutes, an employee is “any individual
employed by an employer.”98 It takes an employer to have an employee.99
P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“Given the lack of choice and the potential disadvantages that
even a fair arbitration system can harbor for employees, we must be particularly attuned to
claims that employers with superior bargaining power have imposed one-sided,
substantively unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration agreement.”); Ravetto v. Triton
Thalassic Techs., Inc., 941 A.2d 309, 325 (Conn. 2008) (“[B]ecause the employer generally
enjoys superior bargaining power in the employment relationship, it is incumbent upon the
employer to make any obligation for reimbursement explicit in the employment
agreement.”).
96
Goldberg, supra note 73, at 1658.
97
Hedley, supra note 80, at 236.
98
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2018); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 12111(4) (2018).
99
Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 661, 665 (2013) (“There can be no employee without an employer.”).
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But unlike the traditional “masters” of yore, employers are almost never
individuals; rather, they are economic firms.100 These firms have their
representation in law as one of a number of forms of business associations,
with the most common being the corporation.
Employees have
traditionally not had governance representation within the business
organization; corporate law, for example, provides that only shareholders
have the right to elect directors.101 Nevertheless, in terms of the ongoing
economic phenomenon that is a firm, employees have a critical role to play.
In fact, Ronald Coase argued: “[w]e can best approach the question of what
constitutes a firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally
called that of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”102
My view—elaborated at length elsewhere—is that employment law
should really be organizational law.103 Rather than casting the employer as
an entity separate from employees, we should consider employees an
important part of the economic firms that employ them. As participants in
the firm, they are entitled to participation in governance as well.
Governance rights would give employees more power to advocate for
themselves within the firm and give them more negotiating power to
improve their terms and conditions of employment. Unfortunately,
corporate law has effectively divorced employees from firm governance,104
and employees are left with the right to collective representation under
labor law as the closest approximation to governance power.105
Recognizing this resulting power imbalance, employment law
scholarship exists in a world of “us vs. them,” where employees are almost

100

Id.
Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 86 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Bodie, Boundaries of the Corporation].
102
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403 (1937).
103
See, e.g., Bodie, Boundaries of the Corporation, supra note 101; Matthew T. Bodie,
Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819 (2017) [hereinafter Bodie,
Employment as Fiduciary].
104
Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (exploring “how, in the course of the twentieth
century, legal scholars and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as
differentiated from shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate
law and theory”).
105
And the failings of collective bargaining to provide power to workers, at least since
the mid-20th century, have been well documented. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification
of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2002) (“The labor laws have
failed to deliver an effective mechanism of workplace representation, and have become
nearly irrelevant, to the vast majority of private sector American workers.”); Michael H.
Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J.
2767, 2767–68 (1991).
101
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always in need of protection against the predations of their employers.
There is much truth in this picture. But it ignores the fact that employees
generally want to have jobs, generally want to participate in the life of their
companies,106 and even want to have a cooperative relationship with
management.107 Yes, autoworkers may rail against General Motors or Ford
on the picket line; at the same time, GM workers are in competition with
Ford workers and will benefit from GM’s success against Ford in the
marketplace. Coal workers understand better than anyone the dangerous
conditions of mining and how companies can risk their lives to save
money. But coal workers also have largely stood up in support of the
industry and have seen the Obama Administration’s harsh environmental
regulations as a betrayal.108 So at least some aspects of employment-law
scholarship should move beyond the oppositional employer-employee
dichotomy and instead explore the role of employees within the
organizations that employ them.109
Charlie Sullivan’s work is unabashedly pro-employee and, as a
corollary, anti-employer. In his assessment of the Restatement of
Employment Law, his metric is employee friendliness.110 He is skeptical of
covenants not to compete and employment arbitration agreements; he
worries that employers will use their manifold powers to take advantage of
their workers. These normative positions are fairly unremarkable in the
labor and employment law academy and, given the subordinate state of
employee power in our economy, justifiably so.
Sullivan, however, has also recognized the role of organization in the
employment relationship. In his article on clerical contracts, he is
frustrated by the likelihood that courts will not enforce such agreements at
all. Although such a result may help religious organizations facing a
lawsuit, Sullivan notes that this species of paternalism will render churches
and their employees worse off in the long run.111 In working through the
106

RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 4 (1999) (“American
workers want more of a say/influence/representation/participation/voice (call it what you
will) at the workplace than they now have.”).
107
Id. at 5.
108
Matthew T. Bodie, Worker Participation, Sustainability, and the Puzzle of the
Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 246, 247 (Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M.
Bruner eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2020).
109
Some have argued that private law scholarship has embraced this dichotomy as well.
Hedley, supra note 80, at 214 (“What I want to suggest is that they nonetheless share a core
sentiment—roughly, that of distrust of collective action or purpose—which is quite alien to
much of the writing which preceded them.”).
110
Sullivan, Restating Employment Remedies, supra note 52, at 1420.
111
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 374.
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puzzle, Sullivan proposes an internal organizational resolution: namely, a
form of ecclesiastical arbitration.112 While still advocating for judicial
resolution of claims that do not relate to religious dogma, Sullivan notes
that internal church dispute resolution has a long history and has even
engendered an “ecclesiastical abstention” doctrine.113 An internal system
of arbitration would allow courts to remain free of religious entanglement
while ensuring that clerical contracts were not empty words.
And in perhaps his deepest dive into the role of employees in
organizational governance, Sullivan examined the scope of employee
fiduciary duties and the potential for devastating damages for their
violation. In Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, Sullivan argues that employees
should not be susceptible to compensation forfeiture for relatively nominal
or marginal breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.114 Because of their
relative power within the typical employer’s organizational governance, he
argues, most employees should not be considered fiduciaries at all and
instead should only have contractual duties.115 Rather, only higher-level
employees should have fiduciary duties related to their positions within the
firm’s hierarchy.116 Justifying those duties, Sullivan argues: “[a]lthough in
theory even higher-level employees are subject to the control of the
employer, typically a corporation’s board of directors, in practice the
exercise of such control is likely to be weak or even nonexistent, a reality
that has generated numerous proposals for reform of corporate
governance.”117 But only these employees who are “effectively free from
supervision” should have the responsibility of fiduciary duties owed to the
organization.118
I agree with Sullivan that employees’ responsibility to and for the
organization should be the quantum for determining their fiduciary duties
to that organization.119 And as a corollary, I believe that an employer
should owe fiduciary duties to its employees when they cannot participate

112

Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 407–08.
Sullivan, Clergy Contracts, supra note 37, at 406.
114
Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment
Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777, 777–78 (2011)[hereinafter
Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?].
115
Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?, supra note 114, at 819.
116
Id.
117
Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?, supra note 114, at 821.
118
Id.
119
Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary, supra note 103, at 868 (noting that, if employees
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in governance.120 More broadly, employment law should recognize that
employees are part of their firms, care about their businesses, and generally
want the overall enterprise to be successful. Yes, opportunism is rampant.
But employment law should focus on defusing that opportunism while not
pitting employees and employers against one another in a cycle of eternal
combat. Employees deserve a role in governance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Charlie Sullivan has taken employment contracts seriously. In his
exploration of contract terms and the common law doctrines that pertain to
them, he has illuminated an area of legal research and practice that might
otherwise have gone overlooked by the academy and bar. His work in this
area respects the nature of contractual obligation. At the same time, he has
carefully examined the layers of common-law precedent that represent
societal responses to private-ordering problems. I very much appreciate
this work.
Sullivan’s scholarship has greatly informed our understanding of the
employment relationship and the common law that governs it. He has
given us new insights on the workings of, inter alia, clergy contracts,
garden-leaves, non-enforceable terms, and duties of loyalty. He roots for
employees, but his scholarship finds ways of working within the grand
tradition of the law and positioning it to best follow the path of justice.
And in particular, I appreciate his sense of curiosity, novelty, and (goodnatured) contrariness. While the crowd is rushing off to look at birds, he
lifts up the stump to see the complicated ecosystem at work below the
surface.121 And he does so with a glint in his eye, and a wave of his hand to
come over—”Look what I’ve found!”
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